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Abstract
Experimental evidence from simple distribution games supports the view that
some individuals have a concern for the efficiency of allocations. This motive could
be important for the implementation of economic policy proposals. In a typical lab
experiment, however, individuals have much more information available than outside
the lab. We conduct a lab experiment to test whether asymmetric information
influences prosocial behavior in a simple non-strategic interaction. In our setting, a
dictator has only limited knowledge about the benefits his prosocial action generates
for a recipient. We find that a substantial share of subjects behaves proscially and
a concern for efficiency plays an important role. In our experiment the information
asymmetry is actually efficiency-enhancing as more subjects behave prosocially than
under symmetric information.
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1 Introduction
In simple experiments such as the Ultimatum Game, the Trust Game, or the Dicta-
tor Game subjects regularly deviate from a selfish maximization of payoffs and behave
prosocially (Camerer, 2003). To explain these deviations, it has been proposed to extend
individuals’ preferences by a social component while keeping the assumption of utility
maximization. Prominent examples of this approach are inequality aversion (Fehr and
Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000), efficiency concern, and maximin preferences
(Charness and Rabin, 2002).
If subjects’ behavior is guided by social preferences, these theories should help to
understand how individuals react to policy proposals as most policies not only involve
the individual’s own payoff but affect others’ payoffs as well. Moreover, for policy makers
a concern for efficiency is a particularly interesting motive because it could allow to
implement welfare increasing allocations even though standard theory based on purely
selfish agents will predict these policies to fail. For instance, an economic reform may be
implemented despite the fact that a majority incurs a loss: When the gains for those who
profit are sufficiently large and some individuals who are negatively affected are concerned
with efficiency, these individuals may tip the scales such that the reform is implemented
nevertheless.
Most policy questions such as reform proposals are notoriously plagued by infor-
mation asymmetries. Individuals will be better informed about how a reform affects
themselves than how it affects others. The laboratory experiments providing evidence for
social preferences are conducted in an environment where agents have full information
about the costs and benefits of all agents. The question is whether individuals whose
behavior is in line with social preference theories if they are perfectly informed about the
effect of the reform, still behave prosocially when they are not perfectly informed about
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the gains others have.
In this paper, we investigate whether asymmetric information affects prosocial be-
havior of subjects whose behavior is in line with an efficiency concern under symmetric
information. Furthermore, as any policy that affects the efficiency of an allocation will
also have distributional consequences (e.g., decrease inequality), we also investigate how
subjects, whose behavior is in line with inequality aversion under symmetric information,
behave under asymmetric information.
In the case of asymmetric information it is possible that subjects behave less proso-
cially than they do under symmetric information for two reasons. First, subjects with a
concern for efficiency face the risk that their transfer produces only little value; maybe
too little to make them behave prosocially if they knew the value exactly. Asymmetric in-
formation may thereby influence behavior: Instead of choosing the risky1 (and prosocial)
option they may choose the safe (and selfish) one. Secondly, cognitive dissonance theory
(e.g., Konow, 2000), which has been proposed as an alternative to the utility maximization
paradigm, may provide another explanation why behavior may change under asymmetric
information. According to this theory, individuals experience cognitive dissonance due
to the internal conflict they are exposed to. On the one hand, they want to keep their
endowment, but on the other hand they feel obliged to behave prosocially. Under asym-
metric information where subjects do not know the exact benefits, this dissonance may
be partly resolved as they may perceive it as more justified not to transfer and therefore
behave less prosocially.
We conduct a laboratory experiment with the following design: Two subjects, A and
B, are matched; both subjects have an initial endowment; A makes a binary decision
about a money transfer to B. Accepting the transfer causes known costs for A and
1Risky with respect to the other’s payoff.
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benefits b for B, with the benefits being larger than the costs. As treatment we vary the
information A has about the benefit level b. While A is informed about the exact level of
b in the control setting, he does not know the exact level in the treatment.
We focus on this simple asymmetry for three reasons. First, it is natural to assume
that even if people do not know the exact effect of a policy on themselves, they still can
evaluate it much better than an effect on others. Hence, for simplicity we assume that
A knows the costs precisely. Secondly, with asymmetric information on both sides the
identification of effects becomes more complicated and to consider only one side on its
own is a necessary first step. Moreover, identification is also the reason why we focus on
a simple non-strategic interaction. It is clear that once B can influence the outcome, A′s
behavior under asymmetric information may change; and obviously it becomes even more
complicated once we allow for group decision-making (i.e., voting).
Thirdly, we think that the above setting has applications. Consider, for instance,
donations. While people will have a more or less clear idea of the costs of a donation,
they will not be perfectly certain about the benefits their transfers generate, whereas the
recipient will have a clear idea. Depending on the information available, the willingness
to donate will vary. Similarly, if several options are available, a preference for a particular
one may reflect that it produces a more certain effect. For instance, Jacobsson et al.
(2007) find evidence that subjects donate more to smoking diabetes patients when they
can do so in the form of nicotine patches instead of monetary transfers. While the authors
interpret this finding as evidence for a paternalistic nature of giving, a complementary
explanation is that subjects want to maximize social surplus. The nicotine patches are
socially valuable (as supporting others to quit smoking and thereby reducing a negative
externality) and at the same time the more certain option than giving money where it is
unclear whether it is not spent in a socially less valuable way (e.g., on tobacco or sweets).
The results by Eckel and Grossman (1996) point in a similar direction. They find that
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dictators are more willing to donate if they know that the Red Cross receives the money
and not an anonymous person in the laboratory. Again, one can interpret the Red Cross
alternative as less risky with respect to its social value.
Besides the information asymmetry, we introduce a monetary reward for prosocial
behavior as a further treatment variable. There is substantial experimental evidence that
incentives can “crowd out” prosocial behavior (see Bowles and Polan´ıa-Reyes (2012);
Gneezy et al. (2011) for surveys of the literature). We want to test whether the incentive
has the same effect under symmetric and asymmetric information. Under asymmetric
information the incentive could interact with the uncertainty. Subjects could “perceive”
the reward level as being related to the unknown benefit level and interpret the reward
as a signal (Bolle and Otto, 2010).
In previous laboratory experiments finding crowding out, this effect cannot occur by
design because there is no uncertainty. With evidence from the field this is different (e.g.,
Frey and Oberholzer-Gee, 1997; Gneezy and Rustichini, 2000): Subjects do not know
exactly the benefits/costs they impose on others and hence could interpret the reward as
a signal of them.
Our main results are that under symmetric information (i) a substantial share of
individuals (36%) behaves prosocially, (ii) 18% of subjects make a choice that is consistent
with a concern for efficiency, 7% of subjects make a choice that is consistent with inequality
aversion, and 11% transfer independently of the value of b, their transfers are in line with
an efficiency concern or maximin preferences.
Moreover, subjects on average behave more prosocially when the exact benefit level
is unknown compared to a situation where the level is known. More subjects transfer
under asymmetric information than for any level of b under symmetric information.
Furthermore, we do not find substantial evidence for crowding out. The monetary
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reward has a positive though not statistically significant effect.
At the individual level, behavior under asymmetric information is consistent with
predictions based on prominent examples of social preference theories (Fehr and Schmidt,
1999; Charness and Rabin, 2002), and we do not find evidence that information asymme-
tries have a negative effect.
As a consequence and given the parameters chosen in our experiment, the information
asymmetry actually improves the efficiency of the allocation. Under symmetric informa-
tion, where A knows the exact degree of efficiency, subjects, whose choices are consistent
with inequality aversion, only transfer when the efficiency gain is not too large, whereas
subjects, whose choices are consistent with an efficiency concern, only transfer when the
degree of efficiency is sufficiently large. Under asymmetric information, however, both
types tend to transfer.
To the best of our knowledge we provide the first experimental design in which
an information asymmetry regarding the degree of efficiency is introduced in a basic
non-strategic setting. In contrast to existing experiments, only the information which
the dictator A has available varies while B is fully informed. A′s decision does neither
make his payoff nor B′s payoff more risky. Moreover, this is the first experiment that
investigates whether a financial incentive can have a negative effect under both asymmetric
and symmetric information in order to distinguish different channels of crowding out.
However, in our experiment we do not find substantial evidence for crowding out at
all. Furthermore, our findings also confirm previous results (e.g., Engelmann and Strobel,
2004): A concern for efficiency plays a crucial role in explaining prosocial behavior. Lastly,
our experiment provides evidence that simple information asymmetries do not reduce
prosocial behavior.
The paper is organized as follows: In the next section, we discuss the related lit-
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erature. In Section 3, we present the experimental design followed by a discussion of
behavioral hypotheses in Section 4. Section 5 presents the results and Section 6 con-
cludes.
2 Related Literature
The experimental evidence regarding prosocial behavior in simple two-person experiments
such as the Trust Game, the Ultimatum Game, and the Dictator Game is extensive. The
central and robust finding is that subjects regularly deviate from purely selfish behavior
though to varying degree.2 One motive to explain deviations from the selfish benchmark
that received particular attention has been inequality aversion (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999;
Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000): Subjects are not only guided by their own payoff but expe-
rience disutility when payoffs differ between participants. More recently, the explanatory
power of these theories has been questioned.3
The experiments by Charness and Rabin (2002) and Engelmann and Strobel (2004)
discriminate between alternative theories of social preferences (inequality aversion, max-
imin preferences, and efficiency concern) and evaluate their explanatory power for sub-
jects’ behavior in simple distribution games. In Charness and Rabin (2002), two to three
players are involved; in some of the games one subject decides alone (e.g., variants of the
Dictator Game) and in some games two subjects together influence the allocation (e.g.,
variants of the Ultimatum Game). In Engelmann and Strobel (2004), one subject has to
choose among three alternatives where each alternative allocates transfers to him and to
two other subjects. Both articles report a substantial share of subjects who are willing to
accept private costs when they can thereby increase the total sum of payoffs. Moreover,
2For reviews of the literature see Camerer (2003) and specifically for the Dictator Game see Engel
(2011).
3See for example Engelmann and Strobel (2002) for a discussion.
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maximin preferences play an important role for explaining subjects’ behavior whereas -
in contrast to previous experiments - inequality aversion has less explanatory power.4
A few papers (e.g., Mitzkewitz and Nagel, 1993; Rapoport and Sundali, 1996; Huck,
1999; Gu¨th et al., 1996) introduce asymmetric information regarding the outcome in
simple two-person games. In contrast to our experiment, however, the asymmetric in-
formation is on the other side: The proposer of a bargaining outcome is aware of the
exact amount of money to be distributed while the recipient is not. Only in Klempt and
Pull (2009), the information asymmetry is on the side of the proposer. They find that
dictators demand a higher share of the pie compared to a situation where they know the
size of the pie. As in their setting uninformed dictators run a risk that a high proposal
leads to a zero transfer when the actual pie is small, it is not clear what drives the effect:
information or risk attitudes.5 In contrast to their approach, we are not concerned with
a fixed pie that can be distributed but with a decision that increases the pie. In our
setting, asymmetric information concerns the increase of efficiency a dictator can create
by behaving prosocially.
The paper which is closest to our design with regard to the information asymmetry
is the first treatment in Dana and Weber (2007). In their setting, a dictator has to make
a choice between two allocations where he initially only observes his own payoff but not
the payoff for the recipient. Subjects can choose to be informed about the other’s payoff
before they make a decision while the recipient is neither informed about the dictator’s
choice to reveal nor about his transfer decision. The recipient only observes his own
payoff. Hence, he cannot distinguish whether the dictator behaved selfishly or chose to
stay uninformed and decided without knowing what would be the prosocial choice. They
4Other experiments also find evidence that individuals’ choices are in line with an efficiency concern
(e.g., Kritikos and Bolle, 2001).
5In their setting, the pie can take on two values, 8 and 20. When a dictator is not informed about the
value and, for instance, proposes 9 for himself but the actual pie is 8, then he receives nothing.
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find that a significant share of dictators prefers to be uninformed and decides more often
to behave selfishly compared to a benchmark where dictators are informed about the
other’s payoff right from the beginning. Hence, they provide evidence that subjects want
to appear as prosocial instead of “truly” being altruistic.6
In our experiment, the information asymmetry differs. Player B is perfectly informed
about the level of benefit and about A′s decision. A in contrast, does not know the benefit
level and he has no possibility of learning the value. Moreover, in Dana and Weber (2007)
the equal and the efficient choice are the same (versus a more selfish and inequality
increasing outcome). In contrast, in our case the benefit can take on different values.
While the choice is always efficiency increasing, its distributional consequences vary over
different values of b.
A recent strand of literature (Brennan et al., 2008; Gu¨th et al., 2008; Bradler, 2009)
investigates how risk regarding other subjects’ payoffs affects prosocial behavior. In these
experiments, a dictator has to make choices among lotteries instead of outcomes. Hereby,
attitudes towards private and collective risks can be evaluated. The paper which is closest
to ours is Brennan et al. (2008).7 In their experiment, each dictator is required to evaluate
four different allocations. Each allocation assigns a payoff to the dictator and to the
recipient either in a probabilistic or in a deterministic way. The experiment shows that
dictators’ behavior is significantly different when they face risks regarding their own payoff
compared to a situation with no risk. Yet, the authors do not find evidence that the risk
6There are several papers that investigate whether subjects are more selfish when the actions of dicta-
tors are not fully observable (e.g., Andreoni and Bernheim (2009) and the “multiple dictator” treatment
as well as the “plausible deniability” treatment in Dana and Weber (2007)). They find a significantly less
generous behavior of dictators relative to the standard game thus also supporting the view that subjects
are not truly prosocial but want to appear as if. In contrast to these papers, we are not concerned with
uncertainty about the decision. In our setting, subjects know exactly whether the other subject behaved
prosocially or not; asymmetric information only concerns the possible allocation outcomes.
7Gu¨th et al. (2008) conducted a similar experiment where they added another dimension: time pref-
erences. Regarding risk, with which our analysis is concerned, they obtain similar results.
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recipients are exposed to affects dictators’ decisions.8
In our setting, under asymmetric information A has to make a decision when he does
not know the exact efficiency parameter. The main difference between our analysis and
the latter strand of literature is that dictators affect the risks of others while in our setting
they do not. In these papers two different kind of risk concerns regarding the others’ payoff
are intertwined. First, as those papers posit, it may be that dictators put themselves in
the shoes of others and do not want to expose recipients to risk. Secondly, however, if
subjects exhibit social preferences based on outcomes, then they face a risk themselves:
When choosing a lottery, they face an uncertain outcome regarding the others’ payoff
directly affecting their own utility. In the above designs, both effects are mixed and not
distinguishable. Moreover, A is exposed to direct risks that affect his own payoff as well,
which can influence his attitude towards the risk of B. In our approach, these effects are
disentangled. Subject A is not exposed to risks regarding his own payoff. We also do not
consider a situation in which A affects the risk of B: In our setting, the gain B receives
when A transfers is determined before A makes a decision.
Lastly, our experiment is related to the literature on crowding out.9 For instance,
Gneezy and Rustichini (2000) find that a financial punishment for late-comers actually in-
creases late-coming by parents in an Israeli kindergarden. Similarly, Frey and Oberholzer-
Gee (1997) conducted a study in Switzerland where subjects were offered a compensation
for the willingness to accept a nuclear waste facility in their community. The willing-
ness to accept the facility decreased from 50% to 25% when a financial compensation
was offered. Besides, numerous laboratory experiments exist which find a similar effect,
typically in simple 2-persons-interactions such as the Gift Exchange Game (e.g., Fehr and
8Rohde and Rohde (2011) similarly find only weak evidence that the risk recipients’ are exposed to
influences dictators. Results by Bradler (2009) indicate that subjects are willing to risk parts of their
own payoff when they can thereby increase the payoff of the recipient from zero (respectively, from a very
small amount).
9For surveys of the literature see Bowles and Polan´ıa-Reyes (2012) and Gneezy et al. (2011).
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Part 1 b is not known to A
Part 2 b is not known to A. A receives a reward if he transfers.
Part 3 b is known to A. A receives a reward if he transfers.
Part 4 b is known to A.
Table 1: Overview over Parameters in the 4 Parts of the Experiment
Rockenbach, 2003) or even simpler interactions regarding control mechanisms (e.g., Falk
and Kosfeld, 2006).
3 Experimental Design
We implement the following experimental design: There are two agents, A and B. A
has an endowment, eA, of 100 points (100 points are equivalent to 10 EUR), B has
an endowment, eB, of 50 points. Only A makes a (binary) decision. He can decide
whether he wants to transfer 20 points. If A transfers, B receives a benefit b, with
b ∈ {25, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70}. The decision reflects a situation where an efficiency gain is
possible. We chose the initial endowments such that a transfer will result in an efficiency
gain and a decrease in inequality for low values of b (b ≤ 30). For values of b > 30
inequality increases in b. Hence, depending on the exact value of b a decision to transfer
can be motivated by a concern for efficiency or by a concern for equality.10
The experiment consisted of 4 parts. Table 1 provides an overview over the parame-
ters that change in each part.
10If endowments were such that A had an endowment smaller than or equal to B, any transfer would
always increase inequality. Then, we could only focus on the efficiency motive.
11
3.1 Treatments
The main treatment variable in our experiment is whether A knows the exact benefit b
when he makes a decision or whether his knowledge about b is limited to the distribution
from which b is drawn.
In part 1, participants in the role of A have to make a decision under asymmetric
information with respect to b. The exact value of b is determined in the following way:
Participants are presented an urn from which a value for b is drawn before subjects
make a decision. The urn contains the following balls each representing one value of b:
25, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70. Agent A is not informed about the ball which is drawn while it is
disclosed to agent B. Moreover, it is public information that B knows the exact benefit.
Subjects make only one decision whether to transfer or not.
In part 4, participants in the role of A make decisions under symmetric information.
That is, A knows the exact value of b. We use the strategy method for a complete response
by subject A for each value of b (25, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70). This is crucial because it allows
us to describe the values of b for which subjects are willing to transfer under symmetric
information and whether their behavior is consistent with their decision under asymmetric
information. Subjects had to make one decision (transfer yes/no) for each level of b. After
they had made their decisions, one ball from the urn was drawn which determined which
decision was payoff-relevant for part 4.
Part 2 (3) is identical to part 1 (4), but as an additional treatment we introduce a
reward for A if he transfers the 20 points. The goal is to investigate whether a reward has
a differential effect under asymmetric and symmetric information. In part 2, the reward
r could take on two values, rL = 5 and rH = 10. The subjects only knew that it holds
that r ∈ [5, 10] and that the exact value of r was determined after b had been drawn, but
they did not know how the reward was chosen. In fact, the reward was determined by a
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lottery after b had been drawn and in all cases r = 5 was drawn.11 After the reward was
determined, all subjects were informed about the exact value of r. In part 3, the reward
was fixed with r = 5. Before making a decision, subjects knew the exact value of r.
At the end of the experiment, one of the four parts was randomly drawn. This part
determined the final payoff of participants.
3.2 Procedural Details
Subjects were randomly assigned to either role A or role B at the beginning of the ex-
periment.12 They kept this role over the course of the experiment. Subjects knew that
the experiment comprised four parts, but they did not know the content of each part in
advance. Subjects received separate instructions at the beginning of each part with the
information that instructions for subsequent parts would follow.
As we are interested in whether crowding out could occur under asymmetric infor-
mation due to a signaling effect of the reward, we let subjects choose under asymmetric
information first. Symmetric information followed afterwards because we wanted to avoid
that the randomly determined benefit level would influence subjects’ beliefs under asym-
metric information. Since we similarly cannot exclude the possibility that behavior under
asymmetric information affects behavior under symmetric information, we also did a ro-
bustness check where we changed the sequence of parts. Subjects then first decided under
symmetric information (see Section 5.4). So, in addition to analyzing behavior from four
subsequent parts one can also compare the first decisions from our baseline sessions and
the robustness sessions without the problem that they may have been affected by previous
actions or parameters.
11Probability 1/10 for the high reward and 9/10 for the low reward.
12Subjects in the role of B had no decision to make in the experiment, but we elicited their beliefs
about what they thought subjects A would do.
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We ran five sessions with 90 subjects in the sequence of parts described above and
three more robustness sessions with 60 subjects. The experiments were conducted at the
experimental laboratory at the University of Mannheim in March to May 2012 (baseline
sessions) and November 2012 (robustness sessions). The experiment was computerized
using z-tree (Fischbacher, 2007). Subjects were students from the University of Mannheim
from different fields. They were recruited using the online system ORSEE (Greiner, 2004).
Each session took between 35 and 40 minutes and comprised 16-20 subjects. The average
earnings were 7.80 EUR.
4 Behavioral Predictions
Under asymmetric information subjects make one choice: Whether they want to transfer
or not. To understand whether the information asymmetry has an effect on behavior, it
is crucial to put it into context with behavior when subjects know the benefit level. For
instance, suppose subject i does not transfer under asymmetric information. Without
further information it is not clear whether the subject behaves generally selfishly (in-
dependently of the asymmetric information) or whether asymmetric information has an
effect on his behavior. Suppose, as an extreme example, that the same subject, who did
not transfer under asymmetric information, transfers for all benefit levels when he knows
b exactly. Then, we can argue that asymmetric information had an effect on his behavior.
The information what subjects do under symmetric information is necessary to evaluate
the effect of the information asymmetry. Hence, we begin with a discussion how sub-
jects in the role of A behave under symmetric information (part 4). To understand what
behavior we can expect, we follow the literature and base our predictions on prominent
social preference theories.
Next, we extrapolate these theories to the asymmetric information case and discuss
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what behavior these theories predict when subjects do not know the exact benefit level
b (part 1) conditioning on their behavior under symmetric information. Moreover, we
will argue why we may observe a deviation from these predictions when subjects react
to the risk they are exposed to and we will also contrast the predictions with an alterna-
tive explanation of why behavior may change under asymmetric information, a cognitive
dissonance approach. Lastly, we will discuss how the introduction of the reward (parts 2
and 3) can affect behavior.
4.1 Symmetric Information
We focus on three possible motives for prosocial behavior that are prominent in the
literature: efficiency concern, maximin preferences, and inequality aversion. We will first
discuss the simple utility specification of Charness and Rabin (2002) modeling a concern
for efficiency and maximin preferences. Secondly, we will discuss inequality aversion as
modeled by Fehr and Schmidt (1999). In both cases we will briefly describe the utility
functions and state which transfer patterns are predicted. All derivations can be found
in Appendix B.
4.1.1 Efficiency Concern and Maximin Preferences
Following Charness and Rabin (2002), the utility of an individual i in the role of A is:
U iA(piA, piB) = (1− λi)piA + λi
[
δi ·min [piA, piB] +
(
1− δi) (piA + piB)]
where piA and piB are the monetary payoffs of A and B, respectively. Parameter
λi = 0 corresponds to purely selfish preferences. For 0 < λi < 1, δi = 0 means that
prosocial behavior is only driven by an efficiency concern, i.e., a desire to maximize total
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payoffs, and δi = 1 means that prosocial behavior is only driven by maximin preferences,
i.e., a desire to maximize both players’ minimal payoff.
Applied to our setting, subject i has to compare two levels of utility. The utility
U iA(100, 50) if i does not transfer:
U iA(100, 50) = (1− λi)100 + λi
[
δi50 +
(
1− δi) (100 + 50)] (1)
and for a given value of b the utility U iA(80, 50 + b) if i transfers.
U iA(80, 50 + b) = (1− λi)80 + λi
[
δi ·min [80, 50 + b] + (1− δi) (80 + 50 + b)] (2)
Given the utility function, when do subjects transfer? For the sake of exposition, we
focus on two discrete cases: Subjects either have a pure efficiency concern (δi = 0) or
have pure maximin preferences (δi = 1).
Efficiency Concern When subjects have a concern for efficiency, they will trade-off
their costs with the benefits and the consequent efficiency gain. Given their individual
parameter λi and the value of b, they will transfer if
U iA(80, 50 + b) > U
i
A(100, 50)⇔ λi >
20
b
. (3)
Hence, the more an individual i cares for efficiency (the higher λi) the lower the
minimal value of b for which i would transfer. Thus, subjects with an efficiency concern
should exhibit the following transfer pattern: Either they do not transfer at all or they
transfer for a particular value of b∗ and all values b > b∗.
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Maximin Preferences Subjects with maximin preferences will transfer the 20 points
if it holds that:
U iA(80, 50 + b) > U
i
A(100, 50)⇔ (1− λi)80 + λi min [80, 50 + b] > 100− λi50 (4)
The transfer pattern of subjects with maximin preferences is similar to the transfer
patterns of efficiency concern: Either they do not transfer at all, or they transfer for a
particular value of b∗ and all values b > b∗. In contrast to efficiency concern, there are
only two thresholds: either b = 30 or b = 25.13
4.1.2 Inequality Aversion
In contrast to maximin preferences, the specification of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) can lead
to behavior that is consistent with transfers for low values of b but no transfers once the
benefit level is above 50. The utility function by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) is as follows,
U iA(piA, piB) = piA − αi max [0, piB − piA]− βi max [0, piA − piB]
with the assumption that βi ≤ αi and 0 ≤ βi < 1. Based on this utility function, the
following transfer patterns are possible: Individual i either never transfers or he transfers
for b = 30 alone, or for b = 30 and b = 25, or for b = 30, b = 25, and b = 40, or for
b = 30, b = 25, b = 40, and b = 50. However, he will never transfer for values of b = 60
or b = 70.14
13In the case where prosocial behavior is not solely driven by an efficiency concern, respectively maximin
preferences, (δi ∈ (0, 1)) the transfer pattern is analogous: Either subjects do not transfer at all, or they
transfer for a particular value of b∗ and all values b > b∗.
14See Appendix B for the details.
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The social preference theories which we discuss share that - depending on the un-
observed utility parameters λi, δi, αi, βi - subjects behave either selfishly or prosocially.
The theories, however, differ with regard to the transfer patterns they predict over the
range of possible values of b if subjects are sufficiently prosocial. In particular, inequality
aversion and efficiency concern predict differing patterns. As indicated in the theoretical
discussion above and supported by the empiricial evidence (cf. Engelmann and Strobel
(2007)), we do not expect that behavior will only follow one type of preferences. Instead,
we expect heterogeneity with respect to selfishness as well as with respect to the type of
social preferences.
To summarize our discussion, social preference theories predict the following patterns:
Hypothesis 1:
a) Efficiency concern: Subjects either will transfer for a certain level of b and for
all values of b above this threshold or will not transfer at all.
b) Maximin preferences: Subjects either will transfer for a certain level of b and for
all values of b above this threshold or will not transfer at all. The threshold is
either b = 25 or b = 30.
c) Inequality aversion: Subjects either will transfer for b = 30, or for b = 30 and
b = 25, or for b = 30, b = 25, and b = 40, or for b = 30, b = 25, b = 40, and
b = 50, or will not transfer at all.
4.2 Asymmetric Information
Under asymmetric information A does not know the value of b. Given the lottery which
determines the value of b, the expected value is roughly 45. We will discuss first how
subjects should behave according to the social preference theories presented above. As
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before, for details of the derivations see Appendix B. Then, we will outline explanations
why they could deviate from these predictions.
4.2.1 Social Preferences
Charness and Rabin (2002) and Fehr and Schmidt (1999) Predictions What
behavior can we expect for different types of social preferences under asymmetric infor-
mation? For an individual i who behaves according to inequality aversion one can show
that the expected utility from transferring under asymmetric information is smaller than
the utility from transferring for b = 40 under symmetric information but larger than the
utility from transferring for b = 50 under symmetric information. Hence, if i transfers for
b = 50, he should transfer under asymmetric information. If, however, i does not transfer
for b = 40, he should not transfer under asymmetric information.
For an individual whose behavior is in line with an efficiency concern the situation
is analogous. One can show that the expected utility from transferring under asymmet-
ric information is smaller than the utility from transferring for b = 50 under symmetric
information but larger than the utility from transferring for b = 40 under symmetric
information. Hence, if i transfers for b = 40, he should transfer under asymmetric in-
formation. If, however, i does not transfer for b = 50, he should not transfer under
asymmetric information.
Thus, we can formulate the following hypothesis for efficiency concern and inequality
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aversion:
Hypothesis 2: CR/FS Asymmetric Information
a) Efficiency concern: Subjects will not transfer under asymmetric information if
they do not transfer for b = 50 under symmetric information.
b) Efficiency concern: Subjects will transfer under asymmetric information if they
transfer for b = 40 under symmetric information.
c) Inequality aversion: Subjects will not transfer under asymmetric information if
they do not transfer for b = 40 under symmetric information.
d) Inequality aversion: Subjects will transfer under asymmetric information if they
transfer for b = 50 under symmetric information.
For maximin preferences, the hypotheses one can derive are weaker as one can only
observe three patterns under symmetric information: Subjects either do not transfer at
all, or they transfer for all values of b, or they transfer for all values of b larger than
25. In the case that subjects do not transfer at all, they should obviously not transfer
under asymmetric information. Similarly, if subjects transfer for all values of b, obviously
they should transfer under asymmetric information. If subjects only transfer for b > 25,
there exists a narrow parameter range of λi such that they should not transfer under
asymmetric information whereas otherwise they should.15 In our experiment, however,
the last case does not play a role because we do not observe subjects who do not transfer
15More precisely, when 2460 < λ
i < 2459 . Then the utility from not transferring (100−50λi) is smaller than
the utility from a transfer with 30, 40, 50, 60, or 70 (80) but larger than the expected utility (80− 56λi).
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for b = 25 but for all values above 25.
Hypothesis 3: CR Asymmetric Information II
a) Maximin preferences: Subjects will not transfer under asymmetric information if
they do not transfer for any value of b under symmetric information.
b) Maximin preferences: Subjects will transfer under asymmetric information if they
transfer for all values of b under symmetric information.
Deviations from CR/FS Asymmetric Information Prediction The utility func-
tions we consider are not linear, but given our parameters they imply that under asym-
metric information subjects behave as under symmetric information when the benefit is
equal to the expected value. In contrast to the decision under symmetric information
however, under asymmetric information subjects face a risk: If subjects transfer, a value
of b can realize for which they would not transfer if they knew it for certain. Alternatively,
they can behave selfishly and do not transfer. Then, they risk that they choose not to
transfer for a value of b under which they would transfer if they had the information
available. As it is the case with decisions in other settings where solely their own payoff
is at risk, in our design subjects may be affected by the risk regarding the others’ payoff
and deviate from the CR/FS predictions.16 In this case, we will observe a more selfish
behavior at the individual level when they are negatively affected by risk: Subjects who
transfer for both b = 40 and b = 50 may not transfer under asymmetric information.17
16Note that neither Fehr and Schmidt (1999) nor Charness and Rabin (2002) discuss the possibility of
risk regarding the others’ payoffs and it is not obvious how to implement it within their framework.
17Alternatively, we can also observe a more prosocial behavior when subjects react positively to the
risk: Subjects who do neither transfer for b = 40 nor for b = 50 under symmetric information, will then
transfer under asymmetric information.
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4.2.2 Cognitive Dissonance Approach
So far we assumed that behavior follows the standard approach: maximization of utility
functions with the additional ingredient of social preferences. There is, however, an alter-
native approach based on cognitive dissonance theory (Konow, 2000) which has been used
to explain behavior in the dictator game and which could become relevant in particular
under asymmetric information. According to this theory, subjects want to achieve a high
payoff for themselves and to behave fair at the same time. They experience dissonance
when decisions have to be made where these two objectives are in conflict. Moreover,
“[t]he agent is motivated to reduce dissonance and may, generally speaking, do so by al-
tering behavior, e.g., when the dictator takes less, and/or by changing beliefs, e.g., when
the dictator believes it is fair to take more than the fair amount.” (Konow, 2000, p. 1076).
The experiment by Dana and Weber (2007) provides evidence for such a mechanism as a
substantial share of dictators decides not to get informed about the consequences of their
decision and also behaves less prosocially.18
Under symmetric information subjects are exposed to dissonance of being nice and
keeping the money for themselves. Under asymmetric information the dissonance may be
partly resolved by the uncertainty about b. Subjects have some “moral wiggle room” to
justify selfish behavior, because values of bmay realize under which they feel less compelled
to transfer. Hence, they may reduce transfers compared to the symmetric information
situation and behave less prosocially than the CR/FS predictions. Summarizing the
18More supportive evidence can be found in Haisley and Weber (2010). In their experiments dicta-
tors form self-serving beliefs about the likelihood that a positive payoff of the recipient realizes under
ambiguity. Subjects also behave more selfishly compared to a situation where the likelihood is known.
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alternatives to the CR/FS predictions:
Hypothesis 4: Subjects deviate from the CR/FS predictions and behave less proso-
cially: Subjects who transfer under both b = 40 and b = 50 may not transfer under
asymmetric information.
4.3 Effect of Reward
In part 2, we introduce a reward for prosocial behavior. The reward r can take on two
values, rL = 5 and rH = 10. The introduction of the reward can affect behavior in two
ways. First, the reward alters the price of transferring money: The prosocial action costs
less, it may thereby shift thresholds at which subjects are willing to transfer downwards
in the case of an efficiency concern and in the case of maximin preferences. In the case of
inequality aversion it may increase the set of values under which an individual is willing
to transfer. Thus, we can formulate the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 5: The reward decreases the costs of behaving prosocially under asym-
metric and symmetric information and will have two effects: The number of subjects
who transfer weakly increases as some subjects who did not transfer before may be
willing to transfer with reward. Moreover, under symmetric information for sub-
jects whose behavior is in line with social preferences and who transferred without
the reward, the set of values of b for which they transfer weakly increases.
Instead of merely changing the cost parameter - which would have the same effect on
payoffs as the reward - we introduce this change as a reward to test whether an incentive
can lead to crowding out in our setting. Under asymmetric information the incentive
could interact with the uncertainty. Subjects may “perceive” the reward level as being
related to the unknown benefit level and interpret the reward as a signal (Bolle and
Otto, 2010) (a low reward level as a signal for low values of b). In previous laboratory
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experiments that find crowding out, this effect is ruled out because by design there is
no uncertainty. Looking at the evidence from the field (e.g., Frey and Oberholzer-Gee,
1997; Gneezy and Rustichini, 2000), however, where subjects have private information
about the benefits/costs they impose on others, a signal effect can play a role. We also
introduced a fixed reward in part 3, where information is symmetric, as a control. On the
one hand, we want to check whether there is a price effect under symmetric information
and on the other hand we want rule out that crowding out - so we observed it under
asymmetric information - is driven by factors which occur under symmetric information
as well, for instance framing effects (see Bowles and Polan´ıa-Reyes, 2012). Hence, our
alternative hypothesis is:
Hypothesis 6: The reward crowds out subjects’ willingness to transfer, i. e., the
number of subjects who transfer weakly decreases and the set of values under which
a subject is willing to transfer will weakly shrink under symmetric information. If
crowding out is driven by a signaling effect, it should be limited to transfers under
asymmetric information.
5 Results
We begin our discussion with behavior under symmetric information, then we discuss
behavior under asymmetric information and the effect of the reward. Lastly, we will
compare results from our baseline sessions to the robustness sessions.
5.1 Symmetric Information
In part 4, where participants A had to make a decision for different known levels of
benefits, between 17% and 31% of subjects transfer 20 points. As depicted in Figure 1
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Figure 1: Percentage of Transfers - Symmetric Information
Notes: The figure depicts the share of individuals who transfer for
each level of benefit in part 4. The exact level of b is known. N =
45.
the share of individuals behaving prosocially depends on the benefit level. The first bar
represents the share of individuals transferring when b = 25, the second bar when b = 30,
and so on. The rate of transfers is highest when the benefit level is at its maximum and
lowest for benefit levels below 50 points.
We observe transfer patterns as predicted by social preferences (Hypothesis 1): We
can assign each dictator to one of four patterns.19 Subjects who do not transfer inde-
pendently of the benefit level (64% of all subjects), subjects who transfer for all values
of b and whose behavior is thereby in accordance with a concern for efficiency as well
as maximin preferences (11%). Moreover, we observe subjects whose behavior is in line
19The assignment is based on behavior in part 4. As we will discuss in section 5.3 below, we thereby
have an upper bound on selfish behavior. Some subjects behave prosocially when they are given a reward
in part 3.
25
Figure 2: Transfer Patterns for Different Values of b
Notes: The sample is restricted to those subjects whose behavior fol-
lows the prediction by either efficiency concern or inequality aver-
sion. The exact level of b is known. The percentage indicates the
frequency in the overall population. N = 11. One subject only
transferred at b smaller than 40 but also for the value of b = 70 in
part 4. We assigned this subject to pattern “inequality aversion”.
with an efficiency concern (18%) and subjects whose behavior is in line with inequality
aversion (7%).20
In Figure 2 we depict the behavior of these last two subgroups for all values of b.21
Result 1: Without reward 18% of subjects show a behavior which is in line with
an efficiency concern; 7% behave in a way that is predicted by inequality aversion;
11 % behave in a way that is both in line with an efficiency concern and maximin
preferences; and 64% behave selfishly.
20We have 90 pairs and thereby 45 dictators. 29 are selfish, 8 behave according to efficiency concern,
5 to either efficiency concern or maximin preferences, and 3 acccording to inequality aversion.
21By definition the patterns for the other groups are degenerate. Either subjects transfer for all values
of b or for none.
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Figure 3: Percentage of Transfers - Symmetric vs Asymmetric Information
Notes: The figure depicts the share of individuals in the role of
A who transfer. The first bar refers to transfers in part 1 under
asymmetric information. Bars 2-7 depict transfers for each level of
benefit in part 4. N = 45.
5.2 Asymmetric Information
Turning to behavior under asymmetric information, it becomes evident that the share of
subjects transferring is larger than under each value of b under symmetric information.
The first bar in Figure 3 depicts the fraction of individuals transferring in part 1 under
asymmetric information. Comparing it to behavior under symmetric information (part 4,
represented by bars 2 to 7), in particular when the benefit level is low, subjects are more
likely to transfer money.
When the benefit level is between 25 and 40 points, only 17% of subjects are willing
to transfer compared to 36% under asymmetric information. Table 2 depicts results of an
OLS regression with the individual transfer decision as dependent variable. As regressors
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Table 2: Dictators’ Transfer Decision
(1)
Transfer when benefit=25 (=1) -0.178**
(0.0665)
Transfer when benefit=30 (=1) -0.178**
(0.0665)
Transfer when benefit=40 (=1) -0.178**
(0.0665)
Transfer when benefit=50 (=1) -0.111*
(0.0659)
Transfer when benefit=60 (=1) -0.0889
(0.0627)
Transfer when benefit=70 (=1) -0.0444
(0.0638)
Constant 0.356***
(0.0729)
N 315
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Table reports results
from an OLS regression. Dependent variable is the individual trans-
fer decision. Explanatory variables are the benefit levels under sym-
metric information. The omitted category is the asymmetric infor-
mation case. Standard errors are clustered at the subject level.
Level of significance: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
we include the benefit levels under symmetric information, the omitted category is the
decision under asymmetric information. The regression confirms what the graph already
pointed out: Fewer prosocial decisions are made under symmetric information compared
to the case of asymmetric information. The differences for benefit levels below 60 are
statistically significant.22
22We also estimated a random effects model. The results are very similar. Furthermore, we did a
Wilcoxon signed-rank test. For benefit levels 25, 30, and 40 the null-hypothesis can be rejected at the
5% level, for b = 50 at the 10% level.
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Result 2: Under asymmetric information more subjects transfer than under each
single value of b under symmetric information. For b < 60 the effect is statistically
significant.
From Figure 3 it is clear, that in the aggregate subjects do not behave less prosocially
under asymmetric information. On the contrary, on average they are more willing to
transfer when they do not know the exact value of b.
The reason why we observe this is a combination of two effects: First, as is clear
from the previous section, when b is known, different subjects transfer for different values
of b. For low values of b subjects whose behavior is consistent with inequality aversion
transfer. They do not transfer, though, when the benefit reaches a certain threshold. In
contrast, subjects whose behavior is in line with an efficiency concern transfer from a
certain threshold on but not when the value is low. Secondly, individual transfers are
not reduced by asymmetric information. We observe six subjects who, given their choices
under symmetric information, should transfer under asymmetric information according to
social preferences. All of them transfer. Hence, no subject who should behave prosocially
according to social preferences chooses not do so. Moreover, we observe seven subjects for
whom, given their behavior under symmetric information, both a transfer and no transfer
under asymmetric information would be in line with social preferences. In fact, four out
of these seven transfer. Lastly, we find 32 subjects who transfer neither for b = 40 nor
for b = 50. Five of them transfer nevertheless. So, if at all, we find some evidence for
increased prosocial behavior and therefore evidence against Hypothesis 4.
Result 3: For most subjects behavior is consistent with social preference theories
and their choices under symmetric information. There is no evidence for a negative
effect of asymmetric information.
Combining that subjects are not negatively affected by asymmetric information and
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that we observe different types which separate when information is symmetric but both
transfer when information is asymmetric, results in higher transfers under asymmetric
information in the aggregate. As a consequence, earnings for subjects in the role of B are
substantially higher when A decides under asymmetric information. Each value of b is
equally likely and the unconditional decision to transfer (0.36) is the same for all values
of b. Under symmetric information, each value of b is also equally likely as before. Yet,
as subjects make a transfer decision for each value of b, the conditional probability may
vary over b and is smaller than the probability under asymmetric information. Hence,
players B have a higher chance to obtain a transfer: 36% under asymmetric information
versus 22% under symmetric information.23 And their expected transfer is 45% higher:
11 points under symmetric information versus 15 points under asymmetric information.24
5.3 Reward
In the second and third part of our experiment, we introduce a reward for participant A
if he chooses the prosocial action. In all cases, the reward was 5 points.
Figure 4 depicts the difference between shares of subjects who transfer with and
without reward. The first bar depicts the comparison of transfers under asymmetric
information (part 2 versus part 1) and bars 2-7 represent the comparison of transfers
under symmetric information (part 4 versus part 3) for each level of benefit.
The reward has a positive effect but it is small: More subjects choose to transfer
money in part 2 compared to part 1. Mirroring the positive effect, when the reward is
withdrawn, we observe a negative effect: The willingness to transfer decreases. For each
value of b we observe fewer transfers in part 4 than in part 3. On the one hand, the effect is
23Probability to obtain a transfer is equal to 16 (17 + 17 + 17 + 24 + 26 + 31)% = 22% < 36%
24E [b] = 16 (0.17 · 25 + 0.17 · 30 + 0.17 · 40 + 0.24 · 50 + 0.26 · 60 + 0.31 · 70) = 11 < 0.36 · 45 = 16
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Figure 4: The Effect of Reward on Transfers
Notes: Bar 1 depicts the difference between the shares of individuals
who transfer in part 2 and the share of individuals who transfer
in part 1. Bars 2-7 depict the differences between the shares of
individuals who transfer in part 3 and the share of individuals who
transfer in part 4 for each level of benefit. N = 45.
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Table 3: Dictators’ Transfer Decision - Reward
(1)
Transfer when benefit=25 (=1) -0.167***
(0.0505)
Transfer when benefit=30 (=1) -0.178***
(0.0484)
Transfer when benefit=40 (=1) -0.178***
(0.0427)
Transfer when benefit=50 (=1) -0.122**
(0.0534)
Transfer when benefit=60 (=1) -0.0778
(0.0504)
Transfer when benefit=70 (=1) -0.0556
(0.0535)
Reward (=1) 0.0444
(0.0350)
Constant 0.356***
(0.0615)
N 630
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Table reports results
from an OLS regression. Dependent variable is the individual trans-
fer decision. Explanatory variables are the benefit levels under sym-
metric information. The omitted category is the asymmetric infor-
mation case. Standard errors are clustered at the subject level.
Level of significance: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Part 1 [4] b is known to A.
Part 2 [1] b is not known to A
Part 3 [3] b is known to A. A receives a reward if he transfers.
Part 4 [2] b is not known to A. A receives a reward if he transfers.
Table 4: Overview over Parameters in the Robustness Sessions
driven by individuals who transfer in part 3 but stop transferring in part 4. On the other
hand, for subjects, who still transfer in part 4, the set of values for which they transfer
decreases. In Table 3 we depict results of an OLS regression similar to the baseline in
Table 2. We include the reward as a dummy variable. It confirms that the reward has a
positive effect but also shows that the effect is not statistically significant.25
Hence, we do not find significant evidence that a reward has a negative effect on
prosocial behavior in our experiment (Hypothesis 6), the incentive works as standard
price theory would predict (Hypothesis 5) and we also do not observe a differential effect
of the price under symmetric and asymmetric information (when comparing part 2 with
3 versus 1 with 4).
Result 4: The reward increases the number of subjects who transfer and the set
of values of b for which subjects are willing to transfer under both symmetric and
asymmetric information.
5.4 Robustness Check - Sequence of Parts
As in our experiment subjects participate in the different treatments in a sequence, it may
be possible that subjects’ behavior is influenced by the order of treatments. For instance,
there may be a decay of prosocial behavior over time and the difference which we observe
between part 1 and 4 merely an artefact of the design. To check the robustness of our
25As before we also estimated a random effects model (cf. Footnote 5.2). We also did a Wilcoxon
signed-rank test. There was no significant difference.
33
Figure 5: Percentage of Transfers under Symmetric and Asymmetric Information - 1st
Part only
Notes: The figure depicts the share of individuals in the role of A
who transfer for the baseline sessions and the robustness sessions
in part 1. The first bar refers to transfers under asymmetric in-
formation in the baseline sessions. Bars 2-7 depict transfers for
each level of benefit under symmetric information in the robustness
sessions.
results, we ran three more sessions with 60 participants where we changed the order of the
parts. Table 4 provides an overview of the new order (the old order is depicted in “[]”).
Most importantly, we let subjects decide first under symmetric information. So, we can
compare this decision to the baseline sessions where subjects decided under asymmetric
information in part 1 to see whether it still holds that in the aggregate subjects behave
less prosocially under symmetric information.
In Figure 5 we depict only part 1 for both the baseline as well as the robustness
sessions. A direct comparison between transfer levels reveals that under asymmetric
information subjects transfer more than for each level of benefit b under symmetric infor-
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mation. In fact, the difference is even more pronounced than in the comparison of part
1 and 4 within the baseline sessions. For b = 30, b = 50, and b = 60 the difference is
statistically significant (Fisher’s exact test, p < 0.07) and for b = 40 as well (Fisher’s
exact test, p < 0.02).
In Figure 6 we depict the decision to transfer under asymmetric information (bar 1)
and the decisions to transfer under symmetric information for different values of b (bars 2
- 7). In the robustness sessions, subjects transfer under asymmetric information at least
as much as for each level of b under symmetric information; for b = 40 the difference
is statistically significant at the 5% level (Wilcoxon signed-rank test). So, as before the
expected income for subjects in the role of B is higher under asymmetric information.
However, in general there are lower transfers and smaller differences in the robustness
sessions than in the baseline sessions.
What is the reason for this difference? If we look at what happens under symmetric
information, it becomes apparent that there is a further difference. Relative to the baseline
sessions more subjects transfer for low levels of b. What is different is the composition
of types: In contrast to the baseline sessions, we observe more inequality averse subjects
and no subject who always transfers (independently of the exact value of b). At the
individual level, the behavior under asymmetric information is very similar to what we
observe in the baseline sessions. We observe two subjects who, given their choices under
symmetric information, should transfer under asymmetric information. Both of them
transfer. Hence, no subject who should behave prosocially according to social preferences
chooses not do so. Moreover, we observe five subjects who conditional on their transfer
decision under symmetric information may either transfer or not transfer. Four out of
these five subjects transfer. Lastly, we find 23 subjects who transfer neither for b = 40
nor for b = 50. Two of them transfer nevertheless under asymmetric information.
35
Figure 6: Percentage of Transfers - Baseline versus Robustness Sessions
Notes: The figure depicts the share of individuals in the role of
A who transfer for the baseline sessions and the robustness ses-
sions. The first bar refers to transfers under asymmetric infor-
mation. Bars 2-7 depict transfers for each level of benefit under
symmetric information.
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Figure 7: The Effect of Reward on Transfers - Baseline Sessions versus Robustness
Sessions
Notes: Bar 1 depicts the difference between the shares of individuals
who transfer with reward and the share of individuals who transfer
without reward under asymmetric information. Bars 2-7 depict the
difference between the shares of individuals who transfer with reward
and the share of individuals who transfer without reward for each
level of benefit under symmetric information.
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So, regarding individual behavior, the reaction to asymmetric information is very
close to the baseline sessions. Yet, as we observe a different composition of types and
thereby a different behavior under symmetric information, it is not surprising that there
is also a difference under asymmetric information.
In Figure 7 the effect of the reward is depicted. There are slight differences between
the robustness and the baseline sessions. Under symmetric information the effect of the
reward is positive in both experiments even though the effect is stronger in the robust-
ness sessions. Under asymmetric information, the effect actually has a negative effect in
the robustness sessions. However, the overall magnitude of the reward’s effect is small.
Moreover, the difference is far from being statistically significant (Wilcoxon signed-rank
test).
6 Conclusion
Economic experiments indicate that people regularly deviate from purely selfish behavior;
they care not only about their own payoff but also about the payoff of others. When
individuals face the decision to support a policy proposal, they find themselves in a similar
situation: The proposal will have consequences for themselves but at the same time for
others. Hence, when we observe in the laboratory that subjects behave prosocially and
transfer patterns follow predictions by social preference theories, these theories can help to
understand individual support for certain policies. Moreover, they can allow to implement
policies that would fail under purely selfish behavior.
In this paper, we investigate one aspect which plays a role in decisions in the field
and has not yet been addressed in the context of laboratory experiments that try to
measure social preferences: asymmetric information. In the field, decisions have to be
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made under a different information setting than in the laboratory. The gains and costs
a person will realize when a policy is implemented will often be private information.
In contrast, in most laboratory experiments subjects have plenty of information about
the exact outcomes available. With this experiment we take a first step to investigate
whether information asymmetries influence prosocial behavior of individuals. We compare
transfers when a dictator has perfect information about the benefit he generates for the
recipient with a situation where he only knows the distribution of benefits that may
realize. The recipient, however, is fully informed about the benefit he receives.
We find that (i) in this setting 36% of subjects behave prosocially and transfer, (ii)
18% of subjects make choices that are consistent with a concern for efficiency, 7% make
choices which are consistent with inequality aversion, and 11% transfer independently of
the value of b, whose choices are therefore in line with an efficiency concern or maximin
preferences, and (iii) under asymmetric information transfers do not decline. Even though
subjects face the risk of transferring at a benefit level which they would not choose if they
knew the level for sure, the level of transfers is stable and in fact even slightly higher than
at the highest level under symmetric information. Lastly, the introduction of a reward
weakly increases transfers. Only under asymmetric information in the robustness sessions
there is a negative effect of the reward. However, as it is the case when the reward has a
positive influence, the overall effect of the reward is small and not statistically significant.
Our results suggest that individual behavior is not negatively affected by asymmetric
information. In the aggregate, subjects, whose behavior is either in line with inequality
aversion or with an efficiency concern, tend to transfer both under asymmetric informa-
tion. Consequently, more subjects transfer under asymmetric information than for any
single value of b under symmetric information.
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Table 5: Dictators’ Transfer Decisions - Summary Statistics Baseline Sessions
Mean Standard Deviation Median
1st Part
Transfer (=1) .3555556 .4840903 0
2nd Part (with reward)
Transfer (=1) .4 .4954337 0
3rd Part (with reward)
Benefit=25: Transfer (=1) .2444444 .4346135 0
Benefit=30: Transfer (=1) .2222222 .4204375 0
Benefit=40: Transfer (=1) .2222222 .4204375 0
Benefit=50: Transfer (=1) .2666667 .4472136 0
Benefit=60: Transfer (=1) .3333333 .4767313 0
Benefit=70: Transfer (=1) .3333333 .4767313 0
4th Part
Benefit=25: Transfer (=1) .1777778 .3866458 0
Benefit=30: Transfer (=1) .1777778 .3866458 0
Benefit=40: Transfer (=1) .1777778 .3866458 0
Benefit=50: Transfer (=1) .2444444 .4346135 0
Benefit=60: Transfer (=1) .2666667 .4472136 0
Benefit=70: Transfer (=1) .3111111 .4681794 0
N = 45
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Table 6: Dictators’ Transfer Decisions - Summary Statistics Robustness Sessions
(1)
mean sd p50
Transfer (=1) .2333333 .4301831 0
Transfer (=1) .2 .4068381 0
Benefit=25: Transfer (=1) .2666667 .4497764 0
Benefit=30: Transfer (=1) .2333333 .4301831 0
Benefit=40: Transfer (=1) .2 .4068381 0
Benefit=50: Transfer (=1) .2666667 .4497764 0
Benefit=60: Transfer (=1) .2666667 .4497764 0
Benefit=70: Transfer (=1) .2333333 .4301831 0
Benefit=25: Transfer (=1) .2333333 .4301831 0
Benefit=30: Transfer (=1) .1666667 .379049 0
Benefit=40: Transfer (=1) .1 .3051286 0
Benefit=50: Transfer (=1) .1666667 .379049 0
Benefit=60: Transfer (=1) .1666667 .379049 0
Benefit=70: Transfer (=1) .2333333 .4301831 0
N 30
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B Derivations Section 4
In this section, we show under which parameters individuals are willing to transfer with
efficiency concern, maximin preferences, and inequality aversion. Moreover, we derive
the conditions that allow us to formulate Hypotheses 2 and 3.
B.1 Symmetric Information - Efficiency Concern and Maximin
Preferences
Efficiency Concern Given his individual parameter λi and the value of b, player i
will transfer if
U iA(80, 50 + b) > U
i
A(100, 50)⇔ λi >
20
b
. (5)
Given λi, i will transfer at least for b = 70 if λi > 2
7
. If λi > 4
5
holds, then individual i
will transfer for all values of b. For 2
7
< λi < 4
5
let b∗ denote the lowest value of b for
which i is willing to transfer. Individual i will transfer for b∗ and all values of b with
b > b∗. If, however, λi < 2
7
holds, then i does not weight the efficiency gain highly
enough for any b in the experiment that the possible values of b suffice to compensate
individual i for his own payoff loss. In that case i will never transfer. Hence, subjects
with an efficiency concern should exhibit the following transfer pattern: Either they do
not transfer at all, or they transfer for a particular value of b∗ and all values b > b∗.
Maximin Preferences Subjects with maximin preferences will transfer the 20 points
if it holds that:
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U iA(80, 50 + b) > U
i
A(100, 50)
(1− λi)80 + λi min [80, 50 + b] > 100− λi50
λi(min [80, 50 + b]− 30) > 20
λi >
20
(min [80, 50 + b]− 30)
If λi > 2
5
, i will transfer to achieve a more equal allocation for values of b > 25. If
λi > 20
45
, i will also transfer for b = 25. If, however, λi < 2
5
, i will not transfer as
selfishness motives dominate.
B.2 Symmetric Information - Inequality Aversion
In this section, we derive what transfer patterns we should observe for inequality
aversion. To begin with, note that it holds that
UA(80, 80) > UA(80, 75) > UA(80, 90) > UA(80, 100) for all parameters as one can
directly see from the following equations (and using that αi ≥ βi):
UA(80, 80) = 80
UA(80, 75) = 80− 5βi
UA(80, 90) = 80− 10αi
UA(80, 100) = 80− 20αi
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Hence, whenever an individual is willing to transfer for b = 50, he will be willing to
transfer for values of b < 50 as well. Next, we show that there actually exist parameters
such that subjects may transfer for b = 50.
UA(80, 100) > UA(100, 50)
80− 20αi > 100− 50βi
50βi − 20αi > 20
50βi − 20 > 20αi
5
2
βi − 1 > αi
5
2
βi − 1 > αi ≥ βi
5
2
βi − 1 > βi
3
2
βi > 1
βi >
2
3
For values of b > 50, however, no parameters exist such that individuals will transfer.
Suppose UA(80, 110) > UA(100, 50) held, then
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UA(80, 110) > UA(100, 50)
80− 30αi > 100− 50βi
50βi − 30αi > 20
50βi − 20 > 30αi
5
3
βi − 2
3
> αi
5
3
βi − 2
3
> αi ≥ βi
2
3
βi >
2
3
βi > 1
Yet, by assumption βi < 1. Thus, for b = 60 no admissible parameters exists, such that
a transfer makes an individual better off.
B.3 Asymmetric Information
Inequality Aversion We will proceed as follows. We will show it always holds that
the utility from transferring under asymmetric information
E(UA(piA, piB)|transfer = Y ES) is smaller than the utility from transferring for b = 40
but larger than for b = 50 under symmetric information, that is, it holds that
UA(80, 90) > E(UA(piA, piB)|transfer = Y ES) > UA(80, 100). Hence, if it holds that
player i transfers for b = 50, i.e., UA(80, 100) > UA(100, 50), then it also holds that
E(UA(piA, piB)|transfer = Y ES) > UA(100, 50). Thus, a transfer for b = 50 then implies
that a player should transfer under asymmetric information. On the other hand, if
player i does not transfer for b = 40, i.e., UA(80, 90) < UA(100, 50), it implies that
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E(UA(piA, piB)|transfer = Y ES) < UA(100, 50) and therefore a player will also not
transfer under asymmetric information.
For αi, βi > 0 consider:
UA(80, 90)− E(UA(piA, piB)|transfer = Y ES) =
80− 10αi −
(
80− 1
6
[
5βi + 100αi
])
=
−10αi + 5
6
βi +
100
6
αi =
40
6
αi +
5
6
βi > 0
And lastly, as βi ≤ αi:
E(UA(piA, piB)|transfer = Y ES)− UA(80, 100) =
80− 1
6
[
5βi + 100αi
]− [80− 20αi] =
−5
6
βi +
20
6
αi > 0
Efficiency Concern For efficiency concern, it holds that an individual i who transfers
for b = 40 should transfer under asymmetric information. However, an individual who
does not transfer for b = 50, should not transfer under asymmetric information. The
argument is analogous to the inequality aversion case. First, note that it holds that
U(80, 100) > E(U(piA, piB)|transfer = Y ES) > U(80, 90) (for λi > 0).
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E(U(piA, piB)|transfer = Y ES)− U(80, 90) =
(1− λi)80 + 1
6
λi [155 + 160 + 170 + 180 + 190 + 200]− [(1− λi)80 + λi(170)] =
80− 80λi + 1055
6
λi − [80 + 90λi] =
80 +
575
6
λi − [80 + 90λi] =
35
6
λi > 0
EU(piA, piB)− U(80, 100) =
80 + 96λi − [80 + 100λi] =
−4λi < 0
So, if it holds that i transfers for b = 40, i.e., U(80, 90) > U(100, 50) which is fulfilled for
λi > 1
2
, then i will also transfer under asymmetric information. On the other hand, if it
holds that i does not transfer for b = 50, i.e., U(80, 100) < U(100, 50) which holds for
λi < 2
5
, i will not transfer under asymmetric information.
C Instructions
The original instructions were in German. In the following, we provide an English
version.
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General Instructions for Participants 
 
 
You are now participating in an economic experiment. Please, read the following instruction 
carefully. It explains everything what you need to know for the participation in the 
experiment. If you have any question, please, just raise your hand. Your question will be 
answered at your workplace. Apart from that, any sort of communication during the 
experiment is forbidden. If you violate this rule, you will be excluded from the experiment 
and will not receive any payment. 
 
The experiment consists of four parts. You obtain a separate instruction for each part. 
 
In all four parts you can earn points. It holds that:  
 
 
10 Points = 1 Euro 
 
 
 
Your final payment will be determined by the payment earned in one out of the four parts 
comprising the experiment. At the end of the experiment, the experimenter draws from an 
urn. The draw will determine one out of the four parts for all participants. You will receive 
the payment which you earned for this part in cash. 
 
After each part you will be informed how many points you earned for this part. You obtain no 
information concerning the earnings of other participants. 
 
The Experiment 
 
 
The computer randomly assigns either the role of Participant A or Participant B to each 
participant. At the beginning of the experiment, your computer will inform you whether you 
are Participant A or Participant B. 
 
 
This assignment does not change during the experiment. Each participant will stay 
either Participant A or Participant B during all four parts of the experiment. 
 
In all four parts two participants, A and B, are randomly assigned to each other. 
 
In each part of the experiment, another Participant B is assigned to a participant A. As a 
result, the same two participants will never be assigned to each other more than once.  
 
No participant knows whom he is assigned to. That means all decisions are anonymous. 
 
 
 
Do you have any questions? If yes, please raise your hand. The experimenter will answer your 
question at your workplace. 
 
Please, read the instruction for part 1 of the experiment on the next pages. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
You obtain the instructions for parts 2 to 4 at the beginning of the respective part. 
  
 
 
 
 
Part 1 
 
Participant A obtains an amount of 100 points. Participant B obtains an amount of 50 points.  
 
 
The Decision of Participant A 
 
A has to decide if he is ready to spend 20 points in order to increase the payment of B by b 
points. That means instead of the amount of 50 points B obtains the payoff of 50 + b. A can 
spend either 20 points or nothing. 
If A decides not to spend 20 points, both participants obtain their original payoffs: A receives 
100 and B 50 points. 
 
The exact value of b is determined before the start of the actual experiment: the experimenter 
draws one ball from an urn.  
The urn contains the following balls, each represents one value of b: 
1 ball with b=25, 1 ball with b=30, 1 ball with b=40,  
1 ball with b=50, 1 ball with b=60, 1 ball with b=70 
Participant B will be informed on his screen which ball has been drawn. Participant A 
however, will not be informed about the exact value of b. 
 
 
 
The Decision of Participant B 
 
 
In contrast to Participant A, Participant B is informed about the exact value of b at the 
beginning of part 1. 
 
Participant B makes no decisions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Please, answer the following control questions. These question do not influence your 
payments and only serve to check if all participants understood the rules of the experiment 
correctly. 
 
 
Question 1. Assume that Participant A decides to spend 20 points. What will be the payoffs if 
the ball with b = 30 is drawn? 
Payoff for A: 
Payoff for B: 
 
Question 2. Assume that Participant A decides not to spend 20 points. What will be the 
payoffs if the ball with b = 50 is drawn? 
Payoff for A: 
Payoff for B: 
 
 
After you have answered the questions, please, raise your hand. The experimenter will check 
your answers at your workplace. When all the participants are ready, we start with the actual 
experiment. 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Part 2 
 
 
 
Participant A obtains an amount of 100 points. Participant B obtains an amount of 50 points.  
 
 
The Decision of Participant A 
 
A has to decide if he is ready to spend 20 points in order to increase the payment of B by b 
points. That means instead of the amount of 50 points B obtains the payoff of 50 + b. A can 
spend either 20 points or nothing. 
If A decides not to spend 20 points, both participants obtain their original payoffs: A receives 
100 and B 50 points. 
 
The exact value of b is determined before the start of the actual experiment: the experimenter 
draws one ball from an urn.  
The urn contains the following balls, each represents one value of b: 
1 ball with b=25, 1 ball with b=30, 1 ball with b=40,  
1 ball with b=50, 1 ball with b=60, 1 ball with b=70 
Participant B will be informed on his screen which ball has been drawn. Participant A 
however, will not be informed about the exact value of b. 
 
If A decides to spend 20 points, he obtains a reward - r points. It holds that 5 points ≤ r ≤ 10 
points. The exact value of r will be determined after b is determined. Participant A will be 
informed about the value of r on his display. 
The Decision of Participant B 
 
 
In contrast to Participant A, Participant B is informed about the exact value of b at the 
beginning of part 1. Participant B will be informed about the value of r on his display. 
 
Participant B makes no decisions. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Part 3 
 
 
 
Participant A obtains an amount of 100 points. Participant B obtains an amount of 50 points.  
 
 
The Decision of Participant A 
A has to decide if he is ready to spend 20 points in order to increase the payment of B by b 
points. That means instead of the amount of 50 points B obtains the payoff of 50 + b. A can 
spend either 20 points or nothing. 
If A decides not to spend 20 points, both participants obtain their original payoffs: A receives 
100 and B 50 points. 
b can obtain different values. A has to make a decision for each of the following cases: 
 
1. b = 25 
2. b = 30 
3. b = 40 
4. b = 50 
5. b = 60 
6. b = 70 
In the end of part 3, the experimentator draws one ball from the urn, which will determine the 
decision problem, relevant for the payoff in this part of the experiment. 
If A decides to spend 20 points, he obtains a reward - r points. It holds that 5 points ≤ r ≤ 10 
points. Participant A will be informed about the value of r on his display. 
The Decision of Participant B 
 
Participant B makes no decisions. Participant B will be informed about the value of r on his 
display. 
 
. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Please, answer the following control questions. These question do not influence your 
payments and only serve to check if all participants understood the rules of the experiment 
correctly. 
 
 
Question 1. Assume that Participant A decides to spend 20 points. What will be the payoffs in 
the case (1)? 
Payoff for A: 
Payoff for B: 
 
Question 2. Assume that Participant A decides not to spend 20 points. What will be the 
payoffs in the case (4)? 
Payoff for A: 
Payoff for B: 
 
 
After you have answered the questions, please, raise your hand. The experimenter will check 
your answers at your workplace.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Part 4 
 
 
 
Participant A obtains an amount of 100 points. Participant B obtains an amount of 50 points.  
 
 
The Decision of Participant A 
A has to decide if he is ready to spend 20 points in order to increase the payment of B by b 
points. That means instead of the amount of 50 points B obtains the payoff of 50 + b. A can 
spend either 20 points or nothing. 
If A decides not to spend 20 points, both participants obtain their original payoffs: A receives 
100 and B 50 points. 
b can obtain different values. A has to make a decision for each of the following cases: 
1. b = 25 
2. b = 30 
3. b = 40 
4. b = 50 
5. b = 60 
6. b = 70 
In the end of part 3, the experimentator draws one ball from the urn, which will determine the 
decision problem, relevant for the payoff in this part of the experiment. 
 
The Decision of Participant B 
 
Participant B makes no decisions.  
 
 
 
  
